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VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
BEYOND ANTITRUST 
MICHAEL J. MEURER* 
forthcoming 87 Minnesota Law Review (2003) 
INTRODUCTION 
Sales and licenses of intellectual property (IP) and products 
incorporating IP often feature restrictions on use, transfer, and production.1 
IP owners have considerable freedom to fashion such restrictions, but they 
are constrained by contract and antitrust law as well as by certain doctrines 
within IP law.2 The appropriate rigor of the constraints on the freedom of 
IP owners to market as they choose is hotly contested within law and 
economics.3 Most commentary on this subject focuses on antitrust 
oversight, but — at least when it comes to vertical restraints4 — constraints 
that are internal to patent and copyright law are far more important. This 
Article moves beyond antitrust and explores the extensive regulation of 
vertical restraints within IP law.5 
There are four important reasons to focus on IP oversight of vertical 
restraints separately from antitrust oversight. First, IP law covers a broader 
range of vertical restraints. It has broader coverage because it responds to a 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University Law School.  I owe thanks for helpful 
comments to participants at the symposium on the interface between antitrust and intellectual property 
law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Copyright © 2003 by Michael J. Meurer. 
1 Lisa M. Bowman, Court: Network Associates Can't Gag Users, CNET NEWS.COM (January 17, 
2003) available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1023-981228.html. (“End-user license agreements have 
become a hot-button issue in the tech industry as more and more companies try to forge increasingly 
restrictive contracts.”) 
2 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1817 
(1984) (no exemption from criminal laws for patent license terms). 
3 See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The 
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 43 (2001); Michael A. Carrier, 
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 761 (2002). See Willard K. Tom & 
Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 
ANTITRUST L. J. 167 (1997). 
4 Following antitrust terminology, restraints that affect competitors are classified as horizontal, 
and restraints that affect users or suppliers are classified as vertical. Much of the antitrust analysis of 
vertical restraints addresses the effect of restraints on distributors and retailers. See infra note 10. In 
contrast, this Article mainly addresses the effect of restraints on end-users. 
5 This Article discusses mostly patent and copyright law; space constraints preclude discussion 
of the interesting role of trademark law in regulating vertical restraints. 
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larger set of policy concerns and because it has more regulatory 
instruments. Antitrust reaches only certain kinds of vertical restraints that 
are especially likely to harm competition. IP law reaches anti-competitive 
restraints through the patent and copyright misuse doctrines,6 and it reaches 
other vertical restraints that present policy questions usually not addressed 
in antitrust. IP law is more versatile than antitrust law because it regulates 
in two ways: by specifying entitlements; and by prohibiting certain 
contracts or practices.7 Antitrust is limited to prohibitions. 
Second, the economic analysis of the antitrust-IP conflict does not 
provide an adequate normative framework for analysis of the full range of 
IP doctrines affecting vertical restraints.8 Both antitrust and certain IP 
doctrines (particularly misuse9) are concerned about the potential of 
vertical restraints to exclude downstream competitors.10 But unlike 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
6 Patent misuse occurs when the patent owner expands the scope or duration of the patent beyond 
the rights granted by the patent claims. Misuse can be purged, the patent is unenforceable until the 
misuse is purged, and no damages are allowed. Copyright misuse is patterned after patent misuse. The 
law of patent misuse recognizes two types of patent extension: the first type involves horizontal 
agreements between competitors who control products or processes that compete with the patented 
invention; the second type involves vertical restrictions on licensees’ use. WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., 
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 54-56 (1973). HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW §20.3 (2002) (distinguishing a vertical restraint from a horizontal restraint by asking 
whether competition between the parties is affected). 
7 In addition to the misuse doctrine, IP law regulates vertical restraints through: preemption, see 
infra text accompanying notes 56, 155, 160; the patent law repair/replace doctrine, see infra text 
accompanying notes 116-141; copyright fair use, see infra text accompanying notes 54-71; the 
copyright public performance right, see infra text accompanying notes 34, 48-50; the brown bag 
exemption to the Plant Variety Protection Act, see Asgrow Seed Co., v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 
(1995); the copyright provision governing ties between computers and computer maintenance see infra 
text accompanying notes 93-95; the copyright mechanical license provision see infra text 
accompanying notes 161-64; the patent and copyright contributory infringement doctrines see infra text 
accompanying notes 62, 96-103, 110-15; the copyright doctrine stating RAM copies count as copies 
under Section 106(1) see infra text accompanying notes 75-77; the first sale and exhaustion doctrines 
see infra text accompanying notes 30-32, 54-56; and copyright amendments restricting record and 
software rental see infra text accompanying note 57. 
8 Most commentators see the misuse doctrine as an anomalous pocket of quasi-antitrust law that 
should be assimilated into antitrust. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF 
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 884 (2000) (favoring identical standards for patent misuse 
and antitrust violation in tying cases); HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §3.2b, 3-7 (misuse occurs 
when the patent owner broadens the patent with anti-competitive effect). 
9 HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §1.3, 1-14 (“[N]ot all the cases that fit within the IP-
antitrust rubric actually involved antitrust at all. The doctrines of patent (and more recently copyright) 
misuse serve many of the same purposes as antitrust law…”)  
10 The antitrust law of vertical restraints is mainly concerned with the impact of restraints on the 
freedom of downstream firms to choose their own distribution strategy. See Andy C. M. Chen & Keith 
N. Hylton, Pro-Competitive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 Hastings L.J. 573, 575 (1999). Evidence 
for this claim is found by examining the leading private antitrust suits addressing vertical restraints. The 
plaintiffs are almost always downstream potential or actual competitors rather than end-users. See e.g., 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 39 (1977) (franchisee); Monsanto v. Spray-
Rite, 465 U.S. 752, 756 (1984) (distributor); Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5 (1984) (excluded 
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antitrust, IP doctrines that regulate vertical restraints are often concerned 
exclusively with the impact of restraints on end-users. The proper 
normative framework resembles consumer protection law more than 
antitrust,11 and the relevant question is how to resolve the consumer 
protection-IP conflict. Specifically, economic analysis of vertical restraints 
and IP law must determine whether IP law should aid a seller’s attempt to 
control: the economic life of a durable good;12 sharing of copyrighted 
works and patented technology;13 arbitrage that undermines price 
discrimination;14 or a user’s decision to exit the relationship.15 I do not 
claim that antitrust judges and scholars are completely uninterested in these 
issues — only that they are peripheral to core antitrust concerns. 
Third, antitrust scrutiny of IP protected markets is in a period of 
retrenchment.16 Recently, some commentators have argued that the nature 
of competition in high-tech markets justifies a more relaxed antitrust 
———————————————————————————————— 
downstream competitor); Business Electronics v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717, 721 (1988) (retailer); Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 455 (1992) (downstream competitor). 
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley list three basic competitive concerns that arise from vertical restraints: 
foreclosure, raising rivals’ costs, and facilitation of collusion. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6 at 
§20.1 p.20-4. 
11 See Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 95, 102-03 (2002) (contract and consumer protection laws are better suited than antitrust 
law to regulate contractual hazards arising in nonstandard vertical relationships); Lisa M. Bowman, 
Court: Network Associates Can't Gag Users, CNET News.com (January 17, 2003) available at: 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-981228.html. (State court relied on consumer protection law and 
blocked enforcement of a software end-user license agreement that prohibited product reviews and 
benchmark tests). See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 4, at §13.5a (antitrust does not regulate 
monopoly pricing per se). 
12 See, Malcom B. Coate & Jeffrey Fischer,  Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 795, 841-842 (2001) (commenting on the social cost of market power derived from 
intellectual property protection which reduces welfare by forcing consumers to replace their durable 
goods too quickly). 
13 See generally, Michael J. Meurer, Sharing Copyrighted Works, unpublished manuscript on file 
with author; see also Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 55, 132-40 (2001) [hereinafter Meurer, Price Discrimination] (analyzing whether copyright 
owners should be allowed to control sharing by end users); Richard Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions 
After Mallinckrodt-An Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7 (Stating that the 
Mallinckrodt decision created the doctrine that “a patentee may restrict use and disposition of patented 
articles and that violation of the restriction is patent infringement unless the restriction violates some 
provision of positive law, such as the antitrust laws.”).  
14 Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley describe price discrimination as a “rejected concern” of the 
antitrust law governing vertical restraints. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §20.2c. 
15 Cf. J.H. Reichman and Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: 
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Goods Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 955-
957 (1999) (arguing that users should be able to negotiate licensing terms more freely and in some cases 
invoke a public-interest unconscionability defense to avoid certain terms). 
16 See Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 
62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453, 473 (2001) (expressing concern that “in the future antitrust may have little or no 
role in high-technology industries, especially with respect to claims regarding monopolization of 
vertically related markets.”) 
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treatment of those markets.17 In particular, commentators debate whether 
vertical restraints connected to IP should be regulated at all.18 
Fourth, because IP law uses different instruments it possibly offers 
more effective regulation of vertical restraints, and should be used to 
complement antitrust regulation.19 IP law frequently offers two cost 
advantages over antitrust: less difficulty fashioning an appropriate 
remedy;20 and lower rent-seeking costs from opportunistic or anti-
competitive litigation.21 Let me illustrate the advantages of IP law by 
considering the regulation of price discrimination. Regulation through 
antitrust requires a court to identify anti-competitive price discrimination, 
specify unacceptable pricing practices in great detail, and monitor 
compliance. In contrast, IP law indirectly regulates price discrimination by 
encouraging or discouraging arbitrage, e.g., the Supreme Court recently 
discouraged geographic price discrimination by refusing to allow copyright 
owners to block importation of lawful copyright protected products into the 
United States.22 The Court could have reached either decision, and thereby 
promoted or discouraged price discrimination without imposing much of an 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
17 Some argue that competition is different in high-tech markets because market power is 
transitory in the face of the gale of creative destruction. Others argue that IP should be expanded and 
antitrust contracted to provide greater incentives for innovation. Cf. Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, 
Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453, 465 (2001) (explaining 
the expansion of IP rights was motivated by a desire to redistribute income in favor of IP owners) 
18 See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 64. Bowman contends that such arrangements simply maximize 
legitimate profit attributable to the patent and should not be condemned through application of the 
leverage fallacy. Id. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §20.3, 20-18, 20-19 (properly defined vertical 
restraints rarely violate antitrust). But see Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, 
Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453, 463-64 (2001) (exemptions to antitrust law, 
including the IP exemption have been interpreted narrowly). 
19 Antitrust is difficult to administer in hi-tech markets because trials are slow and the technology 
is difficult for the court to understand. IP law shares these administrative costs. See Joskow, supra note 
11 at 99 (antitrust enforcement agencies do a much better job performing complex economic analysis 
than antitrust trial courts). 
20 Crafting timely and precise antitrust remedies is a tough job in high-tech industries. See id. 
(antitrust remedies may fail to improve efficiency or even make matters worse); id. at 113-14 
(reviewing an FTC study that casts doubt on the ability of antitrust enforcement agencies to formulate 
effective divestiture policies); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976) 88-91 (explaining social cost 
of divestiture as an antitrust remedy); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF 
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 77-80 (2000) (divestiture and conduct-based remedies are 
difficult to implement effectively); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved 
Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 535, 547 (2001) (remedies should be 
designed so they do not undermine innovation, with a brief duration where appropriate, and to assure 
access to a bottleneck product or service). 
21 For discussion of the rent-seeking costs associated with private antitrust litigation see POSNER,  
supra note 20, at 231-32 (supporting fee-shifting to successful defendants and restrictions of treble 
damages in antitrust suits); William J. Baumol & Janus A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert 
Competition, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 247, 250-51 (1985) (“the social costs of rent-seeking protectionism 
can be very high”). 
22 See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
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administrative burden. Rent-seeking through litigation is more of a problem 
with antitrust regulation of price discrimination because any rule 
determining what sort of price discrimination is anti-competitive is likely to 
be quite uncertain. In contrast, the rule about importation of copyrighted 
works is relatively certain. Uncertainty about liability encourages 
opportunistic antitrust suits and possibly chills legitimate pricing decisions 
by sellers.23 Concern about administrative costs and rent-seeking pushed 
the courts to restrict antitrust oversight of vertical restraints.24 IP law can be 
used to regulate vertical restraints more extensively because it better avoids 
these costs.25 
This Article is structured into sections that discuss six types of vertical 
restraints: restrictions on the field or location of use; restrictions on sharing; 
control over the frequency of use; restrictions on repair and modification; 
packaging requirements; and impediments to a buyer’s decision to exit its 
relationship with a seller. Each section explains how the restraint is 
regulated by IP law. Where appropriate, the antitrust treatment of the 
restraint is compared to the IP treatment. Finally, the policy issues 
presented by each restraint are described. The conclusion compares the 
effectiveness of IP law and antitrust law as instruments for regulating 
vertical restraints. 
I.  TYPE OF USE 
In markets protected by IP, sellers often segment their buyers based on 
line of business, location, field of technology, or whether the use is not-for-
profit.26 They implement this segmentation through contract terms that 
specify allowable uses. The usual goal of this marketing strategy is price 
discrimination.27 Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
23 See Joskow, supra note 11, at 98-99. Antitrust policy must send clear signals. It is designed to 
deter bad behavior — not to “scrutinize, screen, or approve firm behavior or market structures.” Id. 
24 See id. at 98 (antitrust law should not be used to regulate most market imperfections because 
of the high transaction costs associated with such “mircromanagement”). Measures that control rent-
seeking litigation sometimes discourage too much socially desirable litigation. See also LAWRENCE A. 
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 910-13 
(2000). 
25 IP law creates a temptation for IP owners to engage in anti-competitive litigation — suits with 
little merit and the potential to discourage legitimate new competitors. See Michael J. Meurer, 
Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 45 B. C. L. REV. 
forthcoming (2003). 
26 ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) upholds a consumer use restriction in the 
face of a copyright preemption claim. But ProCD is more of a horizontal restraint case than a vertical 
restraint case. The goal of the lawsuit was to stop reproduction of data. Id. at 1450. The defendant 
offered a competing telephone directory on the Internet. Id.. 
27 See generally Stanley J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, 
in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181 (John 
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different prices to different classes of customers even though the marginal 
cost of serving the different classes is the same.28 For example, DuPont 
imposed a field of use restriction and charged different prices for a patented 
synthetic fiber depending on the end use intended by the customers.29 Price 
discrimination allows the seller to increase profit by tailoring prices to 
different customer classes that have different preferences. 
Whether price discrimination is profitable depends on the cost of 
sorting customers into appropriate classes and the cost of blocking 
arbitrage. In this context, arbitrage occurs when a customer in a class that is 
supposed to pay a high price is able to obtain a product or license at a low 
price. A common source of arbitrage is the resale market — a favored 
customer purchases at a low price and resells to a disfavored customer. 
Arbitrage also occurs when a customer violates a use restriction and the 
seller fails to stop the violation. 
Price discriminating sellers try to block arbitrage by restricting resale 
and by restricting the type of use allowed by favored customers. Sellers can 
sue users for breach of contract when they violate license restrictions. 
Various IP law doctrines increase the profitability of price discrimination 
by further discouraging arbitrage. If the act of arbitrage also violates an IP 
right, then sellers can bring more potent infringement claims in addition to 
contract claims against arbitrageurs.30 Furthermore, the IP claims are 
available against arbitrageurs who are strangers to the seller, thereby 
overcoming the privity limitation on contract claims.31 
IP law generally facilitates restrictions on types of use, but its effect 
on resale restrictions is mixed – sometimes facilitating and sometimes 
discouraging resale restrictions. The baseline rule in patent and copyright 
law gives buyers the right to transfer products that they purchase. IP 
owners can avoid this rule, called the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, by 
leasing rather than selling their products.32  
———————————————————————————————— 
Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) (price discrimination in the market for academic journals); 
Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 80-90 (describing the pervasive role of copyright law in 
both facilitating and impeding price discrimination). 
28 See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection 
of Digital Works, 45 BUFFALO L. REV. 845, 869-71 (1997).  
29 See Akzo v. Int’l Trade Comm., 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
30 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
 
31 See David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into 
Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 35 (1999)  Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343, 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing requirements for third party liability for sales that violate a PVPA 
certificate).
 
32 See Communications Groups v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Civ. Ct. 
N.Y. 1998) (negotiated software agreement characterized as a lease even though the document 
described the agreement as a license); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the 
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Resale across national borders is treated distinctly from domestic 
resale. Copyright provides an importation right but it is limited by the first 
sale doctrine.33 The copyright owner can block unauthorized imports, but 
cannot block authorized copies that are imported back into the U.S.34 This 
forces a copyright owner to rely on contract law to block arbitrage against 
geographic price discrimination. Trademark law provides similar treatment 
of so-called gray market goods.35 A United States trademark holder may 
bar the importation of goods bearing the same trademark when 
manufactured by a foreign manufacturer but cannot stop importation of 
goods made under the control of the domestic trademark holder.36 In 
contrast, the Patent Act prohibits any importation of a patented product into 
the U.S, and greatly facilitates geographic price discrimination.37 
Patent law broadly facilitates restrictions on type of use while 
copyright gives more limited support. A patent owner has the right to 
exclude others from use of a patented invention. The predominant view in 
patent law states that because the patent owner can exclude all use, the 
statute gives an implied right to grant permission for some uses and still sue 
the licensee for infringement if she engages in an unauthorized use.38 
Copyright law enumerates certain uses that are the exclusive right of the 
copyright owner. Most relevant for this discussion of vertical restraints is 
the public performance right.39 This right facilitates price discrimination in 
the movie and music markets between home users and buyers who want to 
engage in a public performance, e.g., exhibiting a movie in a theater or 
———————————————————————————————— 
Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1301-02 (2001) (discussing resale and the 
right of alienation). Resale is not a problem for IP owners who license information rather than sell a 
product because they can preclude any transfer in the license. See Ray T. Nimmer, Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act and Electronic Commerce: Licensing in the Contemporary Information 
Economy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 119 n.39 (comparing sales, leases, and licenses).
 
33 See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
34 See id., at 145. 
35 See Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).   
36 See id. at 292. The trend in Europe favors gray markets and opposes the use of intellectual 
property to facilitate international price discrimination. See S.O. Spinks, Exclusive Dealing, 
Discrimination, and Discounts Under EC Competition Law, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 641, 666-67 (2000). 
37 See Section 271(a). Section 271(g) also prohibits importation of a product made with a 
patented process, even if the process was used outside of the U.S. with permission. See Ajinomoto Co. 
v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000).   
38 See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 140-42 (arguing that an absolute right to exclude use implies a 
right to impose any conditions on the use of a patented invention); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1846 
(arguing against this view and claiming it “has gradually fallen into disfavor in the patent-antitrust 
context”). The implied right is made explicit regarding restrictions on location of use. See 35 U.S.C. 
§261. 
39 Section 106(4) gives music composition copyright owners the right to control public 
performance of their music. See 17 U.S.C. §106(4). 
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broadcasting music on the radio.40 
Compared to IP law, antitrust oversight of price discrimination is 
relatively passive. Antitrust plaintiffs had some success in the 1960s. In one 
notable case the owner of a patent on shrimp peeling machinery leased 
machines to Gulf Coast shrimp companies for half the rental rate that it 
charged Pacific Coast shrimp companies.41 The Fifth Circuit found this 
geographic price discrimination violated Section Five of the FTC Act 
because it injured competition in the shrimp canning business.42 
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley doubt the case would have come out the 
same way today.43 They review recent cases and conclude that antitrust law 
permits price discrimination in patent licenses, but the sale of patented 
goods is still governed by the Robinson-Patman Act.44 The Robinson-
Patman Act is also occasionally applied to goods that incorporate 
copyrighted expression, like books and video cassettes,45 but it has not had 
much impact on IP protected markets.46 
Patent and copyright law permit contract restrictions based on location 
and type of use, but patent law goes further than copyright law to 
encourage sellers to impose those restrictions by creating a strong 
importation right and a broad right to control use of a patented invention. 
To assess the economic significance of these differences one needs to 
examine the social welfare effects of these restraints. A common view 
among antitrust commentators is that sellers segment customer classes to 
achieve some distributional efficiency.47 The same argument is pressed by 
copyright and trademark owners who oppose importation of gray market 
goods.48 They argue exclusive territories are established to encourage 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
40 See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra  note 13, at 109-16. 
41 See Lapeyre v. F.T.C, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).  
42 See id. at 121. But see HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §13.5 (expressing doubt that this 
case is good law today.) 
43 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §13.5. 
44 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §23.4 p. 23-35. Courts have rejected claims that price 
discrimination constitutes a form of misuse. Id. at §3.3b7; USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, 694 F.2d 
505 (7th Cir. 1982) (a patentee is entitled to use price discrimination to maximize its profit). 
45 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §13.5 
46 See Meurer, Digital Works, supra note 28, at 871; William W. Fisher III, Property and 
Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 1203, 1255 (1998). 
47 See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 61-62, 64-139 (use restrictions in patent licenses promote 
efficiency). 
48 In Quality King the copyright owner sold shampoo with copyrighted labels on the shampoo 
bottles. See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998). The 
shampoo manufacturer argued that exclusive geographic markets were justified because of the 
divergent marketing strategies used in the U.S. and abroad. Id. at 269-70. 
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investment by distributors in local goodwill and service.49 The empirical 
evidence suggests, however, that gray markets arise to arbitrage geographic 
price discrimination.50 Thus, the relevant policy issue is whether IP law 
should encourage geographic, field of use, and similar forms of price 
discrimination. 
IP scholars have developed a recent fascination with the policy effects 
of price discrimination in IP-protected markets.51 Some embrace price 
discrimination because it has the potential to increase profit and the 
incentive to create, and simultaneously increase output. Others are skeptical 
because of its distributional implications, or because it may actually cause 
output to fall.52 It is possible that patent law’s greater solicitude for price 
discrimination is explained by the perception that the extra profit from 
price discrimination is especially valuable as an incentive to invent 
(specifically to invent pharmaceuticals, an industry that practices extensive 
price discrimination53). Perhaps the same incentive argument is not as 
persuasive in copyright protected markets. 
Two other policy considerations are important in shaping optimal IP 
policy. First, any decision to expand the scope of IP rights increases the 
social costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive IP litigation. 
Converting a simple contract claim into a patent or copyright infringement 
claim gives the IP owner significant strategic advantages because of the 
threat of preliminary and permanent injunction, fee-shifting, and treble 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
49 See Nancy T. Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A Contractual Approach to the Gray Market, 19 INT'L 
REV. L. & ECON. 1, 4-5 (1999). Such an efficiency justification was raised by the copyright owner in 
Quality King, but it was not very persuasive. The empirical evidence establishes that geographic price 
discrimination is common and is probably the most important cause of gray market transactions. 
50 See id. at 6 (explaining that empirical evidence shows that price discrimination is probably the 
most important cause of gray market transactions); David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel 
Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT'L ECON. 167, 173-74 
(1994) (reviewing empirical evidence and concluding that arbitrage against price discrimination is a 
significant source of gray market activity). 
51 See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 
(1988); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 
483, 630-34 (1996); Meurer, Digital Works, supra note 28; Fisher, supra note 40; Wendy J. Gordon, 
Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1367 
(1998) Meurer, Price Discrimination; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1799 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and 
Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of 
Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000). 
52 See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1873-78 (discussing the effect on social welfare of price 
discrimination by a patent owner). 
53 See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 194-96 (1999). 
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damages for willful infringement.54 Furthermore, IP rights can be asserted 
against innocent strangers (perhaps importers) who might be vulnerable to 
an opportunistic IP suit. These rent-seeking costs need to be balanced 
against any incentive benefit before IP rights are expanded to support price 
discrimination. 
Second, IP law can channel sellers into choosing a socially beneficial 
form of price discrimination rather than a socially harmful form.55 
Copyright’s public performance right serves this function. If the public 
performance right were deleted from the statute, music and movie 
producers would find another, more costly, way to discriminate between 
buyers intending to publicly perform the work, and buyers intending only 
private use. One possibility would be a very high initial sales price 
followed after a significant delay with a lower sales price targeted at home 
users. Another possibility would be vertical integration into movie 
exhibition or radio broadcast. The public performance right allows 
discrimination and avoids the high implementation costs associated with 
the other strategies. 
A related point is that copyright can shape the distributional effects of 
price discrimination by building exemptions into a right. Section 110 
provides various exemptions to the public performance right to promote 
educational and nonprofit performances,56 and other exemptions that might 
be explained by relatively high transaction costs compared to the value of 
the public performance to the user.57 Thus, copyright effectively supports 
price discrimination to the bulk of users intending a public performance, 
while sheltering certain users to advance various policy goals. 
Appropriately, antitrust regulation of type of use restraints is quite 
limited. Hovenkamp contends that: “[T]he costs of preventing price 
discrimination without any accompanying exclusionary conduct would 
almost certainly outweigh any benefits, particularly if the market is 
competitive or oligopolistic.”58 The basic difficulty with the Robinson-
Patman approach is that it puts courts in an uncomfortable position as price 
regulators. In contrast, IP law works in the background by encouraging or 
discouraging arbitrage.59 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
54 See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property 
Litigation, forthcoming 45 B.C. L. Rev. (2003). 
55 See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 104-05. 
56 See 17 U.S.C. §110. 
57 See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 114-16. 
58 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE §14.5a (1999). 
59 One important role is prohibition of territorial or field of use restrictions that promote 
cartelization. See Kaplow, supra note 2 at, 1879. 
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II.  LENDING AND PRIVATE REPRODUCTION 
Copyright law has been racked by controversies regarding the rights 
of buyers and sellers with regard to sharing. Even use of the term sharing is 
controversial.60 I use it to describe various types of coalitions formed by 
consumers for consumption of copyrighted works. I define sharing as any 
activity such that a single copy of a work provides utility to a small number 
of end users in addition to the purchaser. This section addresses two 
common sources of sharing: lending and private reproduction.61  
Copyright law displays much ambivalence toward sharing. It would 
seem that private reproduction runs afoul of the reproduction right 
specified in Section 106(1), but many forms of private reproduction are 
privileged by statutory exemptions or the fair use defense.62 It would also 
seem that buyers are permitted to lend copies that they purchase under the 
first sale doctrine, but that right is limited by amendments that preclude 
commercial lending of music and software.63 Regulation of sharing is 
further complicated by enforcement problems. Copyright law recognizes 
the difficulty of enforcement against small scale sharing, and allows 
copyright owners to sue parties who contribute to copyright infringement 
by providing reproduction technology or otherwise facilitating illicit 
sharing.64 
Library lending is the oldest significant source of sharing. The first 
sale doctrine gives libraries the right to lend books and other copyrighted 
material in their collections.65 But the nature of library sharing may soon 
change drastically as libraries incorporate more digital content into their 
collections. The contracts governing the transactions for digital content 
usually include terms that restrict transfer. The copyright owners argue that 
the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital transactions because they 
license rather than sell their products. The Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act and some cases approve of this theory. In other cases 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
60 See Michael J. Madison, Sharing and Copyright: Language and Practice, unpublished 
manuscript on file with author (2002). 
61 See Michael J. Meurer, Sharing Copyrighted Works, unpublished manuscript on file with 
author (2003). 
62 See 17. U.S.C. §107 (fair use doctrine); 17. U.S.C. §108 (library exemption); 17. U.S.C. §117 
(archival copies of software). 
63 See 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A). 
64 See Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-42 (1984). 
65 Many European countries give the copyright owner a lending right that provides a fee based on 
the volume of lending activity. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University 
Research or Teaching, 39 J. Copyright Soc’y 181, 196 (1992) (describing Nordic country photocopy 
license fees set as a price per page copied, as a lump sum payment from each user, or occasionally as 
lump sum per inhabitant or per student). 
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courts characterize the purported licenses as sales and refuse to enforce the 
resale restrictions.66 
The music and software industries obtained copyright amendments 
that bar unauthorized commercial music and software rental.67 A puzzling 
contrast in U.S. copyright law is that commercial video rental is permitted 
without permission from movie copyright owners. The movie industry was 
not successful when it lobbied for an amendment comparable to the 
amendments obtained by the music and software industries.68 In many 
other countries, copyright law does give copyright owners control over 
movie rental.69 
The introduction of reproduction technology to consumer markets 
made private reproduction another significant source of sharing. The 
photocopier added a new dimension to library-based sharing; now patrons 
can reproduce a portion of a text in addition to borrowing a text.  Much 
photocopying does not infringe copyright because of the fair use doctrine 
or because of statutory exemptions for libraries.70 The fair use doctrine is a 
multi-factor balancing test that allows copying that achieves certain 
socially desirable purposes provided the effect on copyright owners’ 
incentives are not too severe. Spontaneous, non-commercial, and academic 
photocopying tends to be fair. Systematic and commercial photocopying 
tends to be infringing.71 
Consumers share music and video by making and exchanging private 
copies. Such sharing has become routine, but the first important case on the 
question was hotly disputed and decided by a five to four vote in the 
Supreme Court. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios the 
Court held private copying of television programs may be a fair use.72 
Specifically, it is fair use for consumers to videotape television programs 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
66 See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc., 846 F.Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994) (refusing to apply first sale doctrine to software license); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, 
25 F.Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997) (refusing to enforce shrink-wrap term that purported to limit the 
first sale doctrine); Nimmer, et al., supra note 31, at 34-40. 
67 Recorded music cannot be rented without permission from the copyright owner. Record Rental 
Amendment of 1984. 98 Stat. 1727; 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A). The Computer Software Rental 
Amendments Act of 1990 prohibits unauthorized rental of many types of software. 104 Stat. 5089; 17 
U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A). 
68 See Robert A. Rosenbloum, The Rental Rights Directive: A Step in the Right and Wrong 
Directions, 15 Loy. L. A. Ent. L. J. 547, 578 (1995); MELVILLE B. NIMMER, DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §8.12[B][7][a] (2000). 
69 See Rosenbloum, supra note 68, at 551. 
70 Extensive photocopying of medical journals at the National Institutes of Health and the 
National Library of Medicine was judged to be a fair use in Williams & Wilkins v. U.S, 487 F.2d 1345 
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam). 
71 See, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
72 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 March 6, 2003 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND IP LAW 13 
so they can view them at some time after the broadcast.73 Many other 
countries initially found such copying was infringing, and then revised their 
copyright statutes to allow private copying, but they also collect taxes on 
recording media and devices and give the tax revenue to copyright 
owners.74 
The much publicized Napster case indicates some of the limits on 
personal reproduction rights.75 The Ninth Circuit found that personal 
reproduction and exchange of digital music files over an anonymous 
Internet file-sharing service is not fair use.76 Additionally, the court ruled 
the company Napster was indirectly liable for copyright infringement 
because it provided software and services that facilitated unlawful file-
sharing.77 In contrast, Sony was not liable for the sale of video recorders. 
Although video recorders can be used to make unlawful copies, since they 
are capable of a substantial non-infringing use, there is no contributory 
infringement.78 
The antitrust approach to regulation of sharing asks whether vertical 
restraints on private reproduction and transfer cause anti-competitive 
effects to distributors or potential competitors in downstream markets. The 
answer in most of the interesting cases is clearly no, thus there is not much 
of a role for antitrust.79 In contrast, economic analysis of copyright law asks 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
73 The Court approved of “time-shifting” as purpose deserving protection under the fair use 
doctrine. Id. at 454-55. There has been relatively little written by U.S. courts but a great deal written by 
law professors that approves of time-shifting and other personal uses as fair use. See e.g., Deborah 
Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1181-89 
(2001) (advocating a statutory personal use privilege). 
74 Generally, European nations have copyright provisions that permit private copying but also 
impose taxes on copying equipment and media that is paid to copyright owners. See Edmund L. 
Andrews, Fight Free Music, Europeans Take Aim at Personal Computers, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, 
at A1 (many European countries impose copyright fees on audio and videocassette recorders and blank 
tapes). For example, the taxes collected on blank audiotapes and audio recording equipment is paid to 
music copyright owners. See Eugen Ulmer and Hans Hugo von Rauscher Germany (Federal Republic) 
in International Copyright and Neighboring Rights, eds. Stephen Stewart and Hamish Sandison, 422 
(1989). Germany taxes photocopy machines and each copy by libraries or schools to cover copying 
losses to copyright owners. Id. at 422-23. Spain imposes a tax on equipment and media to pay for 
private copying. Edward Thompson, Spain, in International Copyright and Neighboring Rights, eds. 
Stephen Stewart and Hamish Sandison, 367 (1989).  Many countries embrace the notion that “personal” 
use of copyrighted works is outside of the scope of copyright protection. See Computer Science and 
Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 129 (2000). 
75 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d. 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
76 See id. at 1018-19. 
77 See id. at 1020-24. 
78 See Sony 464 U.S. at 456. 
79 Antitrust does not directly regulate restraints on sharing, but it may have some indirect effect. 
Companies that facilitate sharing have been targeted with contributory infringement suits and have 
responded with antitrust claims. See John Borland, Kazaa Strikes Back at Hollywood, Labels, Cnet 
New.com (Jan. 28, 2003) available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1023-982344.html. The owner of 
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what pattern of rights relating to sharing maximizes expected total surplus. 
This question must be answered by copyright law (at least implicitly) 
because the law must set some pattern of entitlements. 
Optimal policy toward sharing tries to satisfy two goals that are often 
in conflict: provide an appropriate incentive for the creation of copyrighted 
works, and maximize total surplus from dissemination of these products 
once they are created. A policy that always forbids sharing without 
permission is probably not optimal. It does have the desirable effect of 
maximizing the incentive for creation. But a right to share may be socially 
desirable because the current incentive for creation is too large, or because 
giving users the right to share causes total surplus to grow significantly 
relative to the loss of profit-based incentive.80 Normally, when sharing 
raises both profit and ex post surplus it is socially desirable and should be 
encouraged, and similarly, it should be discouraged when it depresses both 
profit and ex post surplus.81 When sharing erodes profit and raises ex post 
surplus the optimal policy is hard to determine, but encouraging sharing is 
more likely to be socially desirable when the surplus gain is large and the 
profit loss is small.82 
The effect of sharing on profit depends to a large extent on how 
sharing affects demand for the copyrighted work. Sharing affects demand 
by reducing the number of buyers, increasing the valuations that buyers 
assign to the product, and lowering or avoiding transaction costs. 
Valuations rise because most buyers value the opportunity to share in 
addition to the opportunity to consume the product directly.83 In some 
———————————————————————————————— 
music file-sharing service Kazaa sued members of the music industry for copyright misuse and antitrust 
violations and is seeking to bar enforcement of their music copyrights. Id. The claim is based on the 
music industry’s alleged refusal to provide copy-protected music files for distribution over the Kazaa 
network. Id. The district court judge in the Napster case found evidence that the music industry might 
have violated the antitrust laws in the market for digital music distribution. Id. The Department of 
Justice is also investigating music industry activities in markets for digital music. Id. 
80 The Ninth Circuit in Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d 963, 970 
(9th Cir. 1981), and the dissent in the Supreme Court decision that reversed the Ninth Circuit, 464 U.S. 
417, 475 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) argued that the fair use doctrine should never apply to 
reproductive uses of copyrighted works that enable some types of sharing. The majority rejected this 
view stating that even some unauthorized time-shifting is not infringing and that fair-use requires a 
balancing of interests which showed that the social benefits outweighed the costs.  Id. at 448, 455. 
81 This statement does not hold if current incentives for creation are too large. If so, then it might 
be socially desirable to reduce profit (and the accompanying incentive to create) even if that also means 
reducing total surplus. See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13 at 95-97. 
82 Kaplow looks at the ratio of total surplus change to profit change when formulating an optimal 
patent policy, see Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1829-39, and Fisher follows the same approach when 
analyzing the fair use doctrine, see Fisher, supra note 46 at 1706-17. 
83 In some markets, valuations also rise because of consumption externalities. A consumption 
externality implies that a buyer’s direct utility rises when the number of other consumers using the 
product rises. See Kathleen R. Conner & Richard P. Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protection 
Strategies, 37 MGMT. SCI. 125, 133, 136 (1991) (sharing may increase profit because of network 
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cases, sharing opens the market to new users who otherwise would be 
excluded because of transaction costs. Finally, sharing may either facilitate 
or impede the seller’s effort to sort consumers into separate groups and 
charge discriminatory prices.84  
Optimal copyright regulation of sharing must balance the rights of 
users and sellers. Sellers would be happiest with complete control over 
sharing, then they could authorize lending, private reproduction, and other 
activities that contribute to sharing if and only if they increased sellers’ 
profit. But buyers should have the right to share without permission when 
the sellers’ profit incentive is misaligned with the social interest in 
maximizing total surplus. This might occur when users are excluded from a 
market by high transaction costs,85 when sharing undermines inefficient 
price discrimination,86 or when buyer coalitions exert countervailing 
market power that offsets seller market power and increases output.87  
These policy considerations are critical to a proper fair use analysis of 
sharing. Fair use balances four factors: (1) purpose; (2) nature of the work; 
(3) amount of the work used; and (4) market effect.88 Fair use addresses the 
impact of sharing on incentives for creation through the second and fourth 
factors. Courts evaluate the nature of a work to see whether it requires 
strong incentives for creation, and the market effect to identify the impact 
of sharing on profit. Together these factors lead to a judgment about the 
impact of sharing on incentives to create. Fair use addresses the impact of 
sharing on ex post total surplus through the first factor. For example, courts 
recognize that private copying can be justified as a way to avoid transaction 
costs. Courts have not considered whether disruption of inefficient price 
discrimination or creation of countervailing market power are purposes 
favoring fair use — but the open-ended nature of the balancing test would 
permit this sort of analysis. 
———————————————————————————————— 
effects); Lisa Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual 
Property in the Presence of Network Externalities, 62 J. INDUSTR. ECON. 155 (1994) (same). 
84 A subtler but equally important concern is the impact of sharing on the dispersion of buyers’ 
valuations. Increasing dispersion tends to increase inefficiency. Sharing sometimes makes the 
valuations of potential buyers more homogenous and smoothes demand; other times it increases 
heterogeneity and the dispersion of demand. See Yannis Bakos, et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J. 
L. ECON. 117 (1999). Sharing might also be an efficient method of distributing a good. See Janusz A. 
Ordover & Robert D. Willig, On the Optimal Provision of Journals qua Sometimes Shared Goods, 68 
AMER. ECON REV. 324 (1978). 
85 See Gordon, supra note 45, at 1387. 
86 Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 12. 
87 Meurer, Sharing Copyrighted Works, supra note 13, at x. 
88 See 17. U.S.C. §107. 
 March 6, 2003 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND IP LAW 16 
III.  FREQUENCY OF USE 
Sellers are motivated to control frequency of use because it aids price 
discrimination. Buyers who use a product more frequently are likely to 
have a higher valuation and be willing to pay more. Ideally a seller would 
just ask prospective buyers how frequently they plan to use a product, and 
then charge more to high frequency users. Of course, buyers may not know 
the answer to that question at the time of purchase, and they have an 
incentive to understate their planned usage. Thus, IP owners employ 
several different strategies to monitor and control frequency of use. 
One approach is to control frequency of use directly through contract. 
A seller could specify an increasing schedule of prices associated with an 
increasing frequency of permissible use.89 Contractual use restrictions are 
difficult to enforce because it is difficult to detect violations. IP law 
bolsters frequency of use restrictions by adding infringement claims and 
strong IP remedies to the breach of contract claims.90 Infringement claims 
are well grounded in patent law because the patent owner has broad control 
over use.91 Copyright law does not offer a comparably broad use right but 
in some important settings unauthorized use is infringing. Computers (and 
other consumer electronic devices) usually make a temporary copy of 
digital content or software during use. Even though temporary, such a copy 
may be infringing.92 Thus, a digital copyright owner can sue a buyer who 
violates a frequency of use restriction for breach of contract, and also for 
copyright infringement because of the unauthorized temporary 
reproductions. Copyright law imposes two important limits on these 
infringement claims. Section 117 gives software owners the right to make 
copies as an essential step in using a program,93 and the copyright misuse 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
89 Digital technology makes this possible for digital content, and it is possible this marketing 
approach will become common in the not too distant future. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: 
The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 NO. CAR. L. REV. 
557, 565-67 (1998); Meurer, supra  note 28, at 878-79. One attempt with digital video failed to win 
consumer acceptance. See Joel Brinkley, Few Tears are Shed as Divx Joins the 8-Track, N. Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2001, at G6. 
90 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (ruling that 
violation of the single use requirement was patent infringement as well as contract breach). 
91 See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 142-46 (1973) (reading exhaustion cases to permit patent 
restrictions on use after sale as long as the restrictions are explicit). 
92 See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (the copy 
of software created in RAM memory during execution is sufficiently fixed to qualify for copyright 
protection).  
93 17 U.S.C. §117. The MAI court held that a licensee is not an owner so Section 117 did not 
apply. Courts have refused to adopt this approach for mass-market software. 
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doctrine might prevent a seller from circumventing the first sale doctrine.94 
More commonly, sellers control frequency of use indirectly through 
the sale of some complementary product that is used with the IP protected 
product. Sellers require buyers to purchase the complementary product (1) 
through a tying contract, (2) because of product design, or (3) by threat of 
an infringement suit against a competing supplier. The classic illustration 
of contractual tying and price discrimination comes from the antitrust tying 
case IBM Corp. v. U.S.95 IBM leased patented tabulator machines on the 
condition that the lessee purchase all of the punch cards needed for use in 
the machines from IBM.96 Punch card purchases measured frequency of 
use. Rather than charging a rental rate that varied directly with frequency of 
use, IBM charged a premium over the competitive price for punch cards, 
and thereby indirectly collected a rental rate that increased with the 
frequency of use.97  IBM could have implemented essentially the same 
pricing scheme by installing a counter on each machine that recorded the 
number of cards processed, or by requiring lessees to record and report how 
many cards they used (or some other measure of frequency of use). No 
doubt they chose the punch card tie because it was less costly and more 
reliable.98  
Antitrust law treats tying contracts as per se illegal, but actually 
imposes a relatively mild check. A tying contract is unlawful if: there are 
truly separate tied and tying products; the seller has market power in the 
tying product market; and there are anticompetitive effects in the tied 
product market.99 Older cases like IBM found ties that appear to implement 
price discrimination to be unlawful,100 but recent courts have been quite 
tolerant. “[T]he great majority of decisions conclude that the simple fact 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
94 See Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright 
Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 865 (2000). Cf. Julie 
E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 
32 (2001) (the exhaustion and implied license doctrines are meaningless in the software context if 
making a RAM copy or other temporary copy amounts to an infringing “making”).  
95 298 U.S. 131 (1936). 
96 Id. at 134. 
97 Id. at 139. The same type of price discrimination was practiced in Motion Picture Patents Co. 
v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Movie projectors were tied to film, and the patent owner 
derived most of its profit from the sale of film. Id. at 515. 
98 A similar fact pattern was described in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 
(1942). The lease of a patented canning machine was tied to the sale of salt tablets. Salt sales meter 
intensity of use of canning machine. Perhaps the lessor wanted to control the salt used in the leased 
machines to prevent harm caused by inferior salt. 
99 The plaintiff must also show evidence of actual coercion that forced the buyer to accept the tie, 
and that the tied product market involves interstate commerce. 
100 See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802, x 
(1975). 
 March 6, 2003 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND IP LAW 18 
that a tie causes price discrimination is not sufficient for illegality.”101 The 
patent and copyright misuse doctrines evaluate tying claims essentially the 
same way as antitrust law. 102 
Sellers can use product design to implement a technological rather 
than a contractual tie. This approach works when the seller offers a system 
containing two components that interact through an interface that the seller 
designs so it is difficult for a third party to make a compatible tied product. 
The tied component is consumed by users and must be replaced frequently. 
The seller monitors frequency of use through sales of the consumable 
component. For example, a medical device manufacturer named Bard 
apparently used the sale of biopsy needles to measure the frequency of use 
of a gun that inserted the needles.103 Bard violated Section Two of the 
Sherman Act by changing the interface between the gun and the needles to 
exclude other needle manufacturers.104 Section Two of the Sherman Act 
regulates tying through interface design; there is no basis for Section One 
oversight because design choices are unilateral. Section Two oversight is 
significantly limited by the requirement that the defendant possess 
monopoly power,105 and by antitrust courts’ reluctance to meddle with 
innovation.106 
IP law regulates the development and creation of product interfaces 
and thereby facilitates or discourages product design based tying. Patent 
and trade secret law protect product interfaces. A seller can block all use of 
a patented interface, but reverse engineering is allowed if the interface is 
protected as a trade secret.107 Reverse engineering of software interfaces 
requires making a copy of the interface software. Sellers have tried to use 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
101 See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §21.2. 
102 See id. at §3.1, 3-2 (antitrust and patent misuse are closely linked); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. 
Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (alleged infringer invoked the doctrine of patent misuse to block 
enforcement of the patent). Patent misuse is not the same as the equitable doctrine of unclean hands for 
two reasons: the patentee loses both injunctive remedies and damages; and the whole patent is 
unenforceable against any infringer. The Federal Circuit established three categories that apply to 
misuse analysis. See Virginia Panel v. MAC Panel, 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Certain 
restraints (tying and extending the patent term) are per se misuse. Other restraints are per se legal under 
section 271(d). Restraints that do not fall into the first two categories either:  do not broaden “the scope 
of the patent claims and thus cannot constitute patent misuse;” or do broaden the scope of the patent 
claims are constitute misuse if they have an anti-competitive effect under a rule of reason analysis. Id. 
103 See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
104 See id. 
105 See generally Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 
802, 919 (1975). 
106 See e.g.., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 
(1975); Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979). But see C.R. Bard v. M3 
Systems, 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999). 
107 See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802, 928-30 
(1975) (trade secret law protects interfaces). 
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copyright law to block the reverse engineering, but courts have denied 
infringement claims under the fair use doctrine.108 Finally, sellers have had 
mixed success with contracts that precluded reverse engineering.109 
Another, more doubtful, strategy for protecting a product interface is a 
claim based on Section 1201(a) of the DMCA. That section creates a right 
prohibiting circumvention of means that control access to copyrighted 
works.110 Recently, a printer manufacturer filed a lawsuit in which it seeks 
to use the DMCA to control the market for replacement ink cartridges.111 
The claim has some plausibility because the software incorporated in the 
interface is copyrightable subject matter, but there is a strong argument that 
the lawsuit improperly extends the scope of copyright to the market for 
replacement ink cartridges and therefore violates the misuse doctrine or 
antitrust law.112 
The final approach to controlling frequency of use relies on the threat 
of IP suits against competing suppliers of the tied product. An example in 
copyright law is presented in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.113 
MAI sold computers containing their copyrighted operating system. They 
tied maintenance service to the computer by suing Peak, a third party 
maintenance provider, for copyright infringement.114 The infringement 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
108 The leading case is Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). .Plaintiff Sega makes 
and sells the Genesis console and video game cartridges. Accolade makes game cartridges that run on 
different types of consoles. Sega licenses independent game makers but did not license Accolade. 
Accolade reverse engineered the Sega video game programs to discover the requirements for 
compatibility and then made compatible game cartridges. The court held that copying and disassembly 
to discover functional compatibility requirements constitutes a fair use. 
109 See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); DSC 
Communications v. DGI Technologies, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Bowers v. BayState Technologies, 
Inc., 302 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 
1988) the court applied Section 117(1) to reverse engineering. In other cases, courts have read 117 to 
apply only to temporary copies associated with approved uses of the software. Cohen & Lemley, supra 
note x, at 33 (exhaustion doctrine should preempt license term that precludes reverse engineering); id at 
35-36 (patent misuse should apply to attempts to prevent reverse engineering in software license); 
110 17 U.S.C. §1201(a). 
111 Lexmark, Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., Civil Action No. 02-571-KSF (E.D. 
Kentucky) (2003); David Becker, Lexmark Wins Injunction in DMCA Case, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 27, 
2003, available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1028-990501.html?tag=fd_top (preliminary injunction 
granted). 
112 See Jonathan B. Cox, Static Control Fights Against Lexmark, NEWS & OBSERVER, MARCH 4, 
2003, available at: http://newsobserver.com/business/story/2281215p-2146345c.html (ink cartridge 
manufacturer filed antitrust counterclaim against printer manufacturer); Dan L. Burk, 
AntiCircumvention Misuse, 48 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2003), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=320961 (calling for anti-circumvention misuse 
doctrine comparable to patent and copyright misuse). 
113 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
114 The demand for software maintenance, like frequency of use, is probably correlated with the 
value of the hardware to the customer. Price discrimination is achieved by charging more to customers 
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claim was based on the temporary copy that was made when Peak 
technicians turned on an MAI computer and the operating system was 
loaded into RAM.115 An amendment to the Copyright Act partially 
overruled this case by adding section 117(c) which allows a software owner 
or lessee to authorize a RAM copy for the purpose of hardware 
maintenance or repair.116 
Patent law facilitates ties by allowing contributory infringement suits 
against competing suppliers of a tied product.117 For example, Rohm & 
Haas owned a patent on a method for using an unpatented chemical named 
propanil as a herbicide.118 The company effectively tied sale of propanil to 
a license to practice the method by refusing to license any farmer who 
obtained propanil from another source.119 Rohm & Haas sued a competing 
manufacturer of propanil for contributory infringement. The paramount 
question was whether the tie was justified as a means of controlling 
contributory infringement, or instead was a misuse of the patent which 
would have made the patent unenforceable. Section 271(c) specifies that a 
person is liable for contributory infringement if they sell a component of a 
patented machine, or a material for use in practicing a patented process.120 
A critical element of a contributory infringement claim is a showing that 
the defendant’s product is a non-staple, i.e., not suitable for substantial non-
infringing use.121 Propanil was a non-staple since it had no use except to 
practice the patented method.122 Ties that serve to deter contributory 
infringement fall into a safe harbor created in Section 271(d) which assures 
that such a tie is not misuse.123 Applying §271(c) and (d) the Court found 
Dawson Chemical’s sale of propanil was contributory patent infringement 
———————————————————————————————— 
who need a lot of maintenance, and presumably they are high frequency and high value customers. See 
Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 88. 
115See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-20 (9th Cir. 1993) 
116 17 U.S.C. §117.  The new provision does not apply to software maintenance. 
117 Patent law once was hostile to such ties but today promotes the use of ties to combat 
contributory infringement. The hostility peaked in the 1940s with cases like Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell 
Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). Recent cases have been quite tolerant. See Dawson Chemical v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). 
118 See Dawson Chemical v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). 
119 See id. at 186. 
120 35 U.S.C. §271(c). If there is no underlying infringement, then there can be no contributory 
infringement. Also the defendant must have knowledge of patent infringement not just knowledge of 
the sort of use that end users engage in. 
121 35 U.S.C. §271(c). 
122 See Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 185-86. 
123 35 U.S.C. §271(d). If the tie is not designed to enforce rights against contributory 
infringement, then it is judged by normal misuse standards which mirror antitrust standards applied to 
ties. 
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and there was no patent misuse.124 
The diverse marketing practices discussed in this section are linked by 
the notion that they can all be used to implement price discrimination based 
on frequency of use.125 Many of the normative issues raised in the context 
of type of use restrictions and price discrimination apply here. For example, 
the output effect of usage based pricing can be positive or negative. Output 
based pricing tends to draw new customers into a market, specifically, 
customers who are infrequent users who are attracted by the relatively low 
price charged for infrequent use. Consumption tends to fall among current 
customers who formerly consumed as much as they wanted, and now face a 
positive price for each additional use. 126 
An important and difficult policy issue concerns coordination of 
antitrust and IP law to channel frequency of use pricing toward socially 
advantageous implementation methods.127 Some methods are prohibited by 
antitrust and misuse law.128 Sellers committed to usage based pricing will 
choose the most profitable of the permissible methods; their choice will 
depend on the way IP law affects the cost of various methods. IP 
encourages product design ties by protecting interfaces with patents, trade 
secret law and anti-circumvention law. It discourages design ties by 
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124 See Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 221-23. 
125 The restraints discussed in this section have many other possible uses. Tying arrangements 
promote efficiency in a variety of ways. They serve a quality control function. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., 
supra note 6 at §21.2a. Information about frequency of use helps a lessor properly maintain leased 
equipment. Id. at §21.2e. Usage charges help diffuse something economists call the “adverse selection 
problem.” Cite. A potential user who is unsure about the value of a new technology can be reassured by 
an arrangement that requires payment only if he actually uses the product. Id. Further, strong IP 
protection of design interfaces allows the producer of the tying product to license competing 
manufacturers of the tied product and maintain control over the price of the tied product in order to 
mitigate pricing externalities facing tied product suppliers. See Douglas G. Lichtman, Property Rights 
in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615, 616-20 (2000). 
Tying arrangement also pose risks of anti-competitive harm. The main hazards are foreclosure 
and promotion of collusion. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §§21.3c, 21.3d. The law 
governing product compatibility and reverse engineering should attend closely anti-competitive 
hazards. See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in 
Digital Form: Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 49 (1993). Copyright 
protection should be limited so copyright holders cannot expand their copyright software protection to 
related markets. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1588-90 (2002) (evaluating the social welfare effect of reverse 
engineering in terms of incentive to innovate, incentive for follow-on innovation, price, and wasted 
cost). 
126 See Meurer Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 125-26. 
127 An interesting question is whether the law should encourage IP owners to choose software 
interfaces to implement metering, because it is cheaper than using physical interfaces. 
128 Antitrust law regulates contractual tying more closely than technological tying. See 
HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6 at §21.5b2 (noting that most ties cannot be challenged under Section 
One of the Sherman Act, or Section Three of the Clayton Act, and they are difficult to invalidate under 
Section Two of the Sherman Act). 
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treating reverse engineering as lawful under copyright and trade secret 
law.129 Patent law encourages ties involving non-staples and copyright law 
encourages direct frequency of use pricing by making temporary digital 
copies infringing.130 
The appropriate scope of the contributory infringement doctrine is 
another crucial policy issue facing IP law.131 Liability attaches to 
defendants who sell a product or component that is not capable of a 
substantial non-infringing use. The scope of the doctrine can be adjusted by 
narrow or broad interpretation of the terms capable of and substantial.132 
Broader scope encourages usage based pricing, makes enforcement easier, 
and increases the value of a patent or copyright. Narrower scope 
encourages sale of the defendant’s product, and reduces rent-seeking IP 
litigation. The contributory infringement doctrine provides a social benefit 
by reducing enforcement costs. A process patent, like the one in Dawson 
Chemical, is difficult to enforce when practice of the process is easy to 
hide. 133 Patent law eases the enforcement burden for processes that 
consume a non-staple input (like propanil) because sales of the input are 
difficult to hide and can be targeted for enforcement action by the patent 
owner.134 The doctrine needs to be limited though to prevent over-
rewarding patentees and shifting too much of the cost of enforcement to 
third parties.135 An overly broad doctrine also creates the danger that the 
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129 There is a conflict between the circuits regarding contracts that prohibit reverse engineering. 
The Fifth Circuit preempted a term that prohibited reversed engineering under the copyright statute, see 
Vault v. Quaid, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), but the Federal Circuit refused to apply preemption in a 
similar setting, see Bowers v. Baystate Technology, 302 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 95-106. 
131 See Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (defining non-staple in 
patent law); Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other 
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 940 (2001) “[W]e have little idea of what the copyright 
staple article of commerce doctrine means. Neither the Supreme Court nor subsequent lower court 
decisions have elucidated what kinds of products or services can qualify as staple articles of commerce, 
nor have they provided a framework for deciding whether such an article has a ‘substantial non-
infringing use.’” 
132 See 35 U.S.C. §271(c); Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
434-42 (1984). The term substantial is not clearly defined, but apparently it is less stringent than 
requiring the majority of uses are non-infringing. Id. at 490-92 (J. Blackmun dissenting) Further, the 
phrase capable of indicates that future non-infringing uses are sufficient to escape liability. 
133 See Dawson Chemical v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980); Michael A. 
Shimokaji, Inducement and Contributory Infringement Theories to Regulate Pre-Patent Issuance 
Activity, 37 IDEA: THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 571, 586 (1997). 
134 Additional enforcement benefits arise because the patent owner can reduce the number of 
suits required for effective enforcement and because the smaller profit from suing direct infringers 
sometimes makes those suits unprofitable. [Common sense: no authority needed.] 
135 See C.R. Bard, Inc., v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(When an item that is sold to the public might have non-infringing as well as infringing uses “the public 
interest in access to that article is necessarily implicated.”); Dogan, supra note 110, at 942 (advocating 
an approach that focuses on consumer access to markets outside the scope of the copyright); but see 
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seller of a staple product could be exploited through an opportunistic patent 
or copyright suit.136  
IV.  REPAIR AND MODIFICATION 
It is not unusual in IP protected markets for sellers to make strategic 
decisions about the durability of their products. Naturally, they make 
product design decisions that affect product durability, but sellers also use 
vertical restraints to control the economic life of a product. Specifically, 
they can use contract and IP law to restrict or prohibit user repair or 
modification — the effect of these restrictions is to stop users from 
extending the economic life of their products. These restrictions can be 
profitable in three different ways. First, they help the seller control 
frequency of use and implement price discrimination. Second, they help the 
seller suppress the second-hand market. And third, they help the seller 
maintain a monopoly sales price. 
The previous section explained that sellers often use the sale of a tied 
product to measure the frequency of use of a tying product. Buyers can 
thwart this strategy by reusing the tied product. Sellers can respond by 
making it difficult to reuse the tied product. Such a struggle apparently is 
taking place in the printer market.137 Printer companies tie the sale of ink 
cartridges to printers because cartridge sales are a good measure of 
frequency of use. Printer companies have discouraged third party cartridge 
suppliers by making it difficult to design a compatible cartridge and by 
enforcing patent and copyright rights.138 Buyers responded by simply 
refilling empty cartridges with ink. Hewlett Packard countered by 
designing cartridges to be non-refillable.139 A company named Repeat-O-
Type Stencil purchased HP ink cartridges, modified them so that they could 
———————————————————————————————— 
BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 146-49, 153-54 (approving cases finding that divisibility of the right to 
control use implies that tying a staple article of commerce to a patent license is acceptable). When 
enforcement costs are shifted from IP owners to third parties they might act as a tax on socially valuable 
new technology that incidentally facilitates IP infringement. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for 
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 176 (1999) (must be careful not to discourage technological 
progress). 
136 See Meurer, supra note 25, at 5. 
137 See Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil, 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Becker, 
supra note 93  (“Printer makers have employed a variety of technological means in recent years to 
undercut the market for recycled toner and ink cartridges, which typically sell for much less than 
original items. Most printer makers sell their printers at or near cost, making their profit from sales of 
supplies.”). 
 
138 See id. at 1448-50 (patent and trademark infringement claims); Lexmark, Int’l Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., Civil Action No. 02-571-KSF (E.D. Kentucky) (2003). 
139 See Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil, 123 F.3d 1445, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
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be refilled, and sold them to the public. HP sued Repeat-O-Type for patent 
infringement. The Federal Circuit ruled against HP and held the 
modification was not infringing.140 
Sellers also limit reuse of a product outside the tying context. Medical 
device makers often limit buyers to a single use of a product even though 
the product could be refurbished and reused.141 The most likely rationale is 
to discourage the development of a second-hand market.142 Mallinckrodt v. 
Medipart143 featured a patented medical device used to deliver mist to the 
lungs of patients. The patent owner marked the device: “For Single Use 
Only.” The defendant salvaged used devices, sterilized the main parts and 
resold them. The court treated the label as a valid contract term and 
enforced the restriction despite an objection that the restriction violated the 
exhaustion doctrine.144 
Even if a patent owner fails to impose a contractual restraint on reuse, 
it can still prohibit certain kinds of reuse that are characterized as infringing 
reconstruction. In Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons145 the patent owner sold 
patented metal bands used to tie bales of cotton. When the cotton bales 
arrived at the cotton mill the bands were cut. The defendant collected and 
recycled the bands. The Court held this was infringing reconstruction.146 
When courts want to limit the patent owner’s control over reuse they 
characterize a defendant’s actions as repair rather than reconstruction.147 
Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Tech., Inc.,148 illustrates non-infringing 
repair. The patent covered a medical device that creates pressure used to 
treat and prevent deep vein thrombosis. The invention comprises a pump, 
tube, and pressure sleeve. The pressure sleeve is marked: “For Single Use 
Only.” The defendant made and sold replacement sleeves. The combination 
of the old tube and pump with the replacement sleeves was not 
reconstruction of the invention, rather it was non-infringing repair.149 
Sellers restrict repair of some patented devices even when tying and 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
140 See id. at 1454.  
141 See e.g., Karl Storz Endoscopy-America Inc. v. Surgical Technologies Inc. 285 F.3d 848 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (reversing summary judgment for defendant because reconstruction of medical device might 
constitute trademark infringement). 
142 See id. at 852-53. This restriction could also be valuable to the seller as a way to monitor 
frequency of use.  
143 See id. at 709. 
144 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
145 106 U.S. 89 (1882).  
146 Id. at 94.  
147 Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied 
License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423 (1999).  
148  85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
149 See id. at 1574-76. 
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second-hard markets are not present. Such restrictions may be necessary to 
support a high sale price that is predicated on the belief that consumers will 
return to purchase a replacement from the patent owner when the device 
they currently own reaches an optimal retirement age. Ideally, a seller 
should encourage users to properly maintain a device to prolong its life, 
and discourage inefficient repairs and modifications. A buyer might 
practice inefficient repair because the seller uses its market power to set the 
replacement price above the cost of the replacement.150 This theory justifies 
certain contractual restrictions on repair and also the practice of 
characterizing certain activities as infringing reconstruction even though 
that might easily be characterized as repair instead.151 
In Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E. J. Co.,152 the defendant placed new tips on 
drill bits covered by plaintiff’s drill patent. Even though the drill tip was 
not separately patented, the court ruled this was infringing 
reconstruction.153 The court distinguished and permitted users to sharpen 
the tip when it becomes dull.154 The court emphasized that sharpening a 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
150 Let me illustrate this result with an example. To keep the story simple, suppose that there are 
six years remaining in the term of the patent that protects a durable good, and suppose there is no 
discounting of future costs and benefits. The good provides a benefit of 5 for each year of use. It costs 4 
to make a new good, and the good lasts for two years if it is not repaired. The user can repair the good 
at a cost of 3 and extend its life by one year, so a repaired good lasts a total of three years. In this 
setting, repair is inefficient because it costs 3 to get a year of service from a good through repair, but 
only 4/2 = 2 to get a year of service from manufacture of a new good. If the user is not allowed to repair 
the good, then the patent owner will charge 10 for the good, and a user would make three purchases 
over the remaining six years of the patent. The patent owner would earn a profit of 10 - 4 = 6 on each 
sale for a total profit of 18 from each user. 
If the user is allowed to repair the good, then the seller will earn a smaller total profit, and the 
user will engage in inefficient repair. At the previous price of 10, a user would only make two 
purchases instead of three over the remaining patent term. The user would repair the good at the end of 
the second year by paying the repair cost of 4. By making repairs, the user limits her total costs over the 
six years to 2(10) + 2(3) = 26, the cost of two purchases and two repairs. This is smaller than the cost of 
three purchases, and it delivers the same benefit. If the patent owner charged a price of 10 it would get a 
profit from each user of 12 not 18, because it would make two sales not three. The patent owner 
actually maximizes its profit by raising the price to 12. Users make two purchases and perform two 
repairs. The patent owner earns a profit of 12 - 4 = 8 on each sale for a total profit of 16 from each user. 
If the patent owner wanted to induce users to make three purchases and forego inefficient repair, it 
would have to cut the price to 6. But the patent owner would not choose such a low price because it 
gives a profit of only 6-4 = 2 on each sale for a total profit of 6 from each user. 
151  Compare Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961) 
(replacement of fabric in patented roof for convertible car is not infringing), to Sandvik Aktiebolag v. 
E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (replacement of drill tip is infringing). 
Reconstruction occurs when a spent article is made new. Relevant factors include: whether some 
component has a shorter useful life than the article as a whole, how the article is designed, the existence 
of a market to make or service a part, and the nature of the defendant’s actions. See id. at 673. 
152  121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
153  Id. at 674. 
154  Id. 
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dull tip is a routine practice, but replacing a tip is difficult and expensive.155 
Users only place a new tip on a drill when it is no longer possible to 
sharpen the old tip properly. This distinction makes economic sense if the 
savings that results from deferring the manufacture of a new drill are 
smaller than the cost of replacing a tip and larger than the cost of 
sharpening a tip.156 
Software publishers often prohibit software modification; this vertical 
restraint prevents users from extending the economic life of the software 
and may have a similar effect to restraints on the repair of patented 
products.157 Some users modify software so they can add new features or 
move it to a new platform.158 The seller might prefer the user buy a new 
version of the software rather than modify an old version. The adaptation 
right in copyright law applies to software modifications and makes them 
infringing,159 but the right is significantly constrained by Section 117160 and 
the fair use doctrine.161 Despite these limitations on the adaptation right, 
contract terms that restrict modification are likely to be enforced.162 
Vertical restraints affecting repair and modification help sellers 
control the economic life of their products. Policy analysis of these 
restraints raises two interesting questions. First, do the restraints promote 
efficient repair and modification or instead wasteful obsolescence? And 
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155  Id. at 673. 
156 This approach could reach similar outcomes to the approach proposed by Janis. He 
recommends that the reasonable expectations of the parties should guide the characterization of an 
activity as repair or reconstruction. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, 
Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 428, 485 
(1999). The approaches coincide if the parties expectations are simply that repair will be undertaken if 
and only if it is efficient. 
157 See Meurer, Price Discriminination, supra note 13, at 86. Cf CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. 
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 193 (1999) 
(discussing strategy used for software upgrades). 
158 See id. 
159 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 923 (1983); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 
160 See 17 U.S.C. §117(a) (allows adaptation required as an essential step in use of a computer 
program or adaptation for archival purposes); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding an act which allows sellers to prohibit adaptation rights of software conflicts 
with the rights of users under § 117 and is federally preempted); Pamela Samuelson, Symposium on 
U.S.-E.C. Legal Relations: Comparing U.S. And EC Copyright Protection For Computer Programs: 
Are They More Different Than They Seem? 13 J.L. & Com. 279, 284 (1994) (Section 117 allows 
modification to run a program on a different machine). 
161 See Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. den., 507 
U.S. 985 (1993). The defendant Galoob was accused of contributory infringement by making and 
selling devices that enable Nintendo videogame users to create unauthorized derivative works. Galoob 
manufactured a device called the Game Genie that was used to change features the games. The court 
denied that a derivative work existed and in the alternative applied the fair use doctrine. But see Micro 
Star v. Formgen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998) (overruling Galoob). 
162 See Samuelson, supra note 130, at  284. 
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second, are the restraints necessary to assure IP owners capture an adequate 
reward in durable product markets? 
IP owners would argue that restraints on reconstruction encourage 
efficient repair, and help support the high profit level required to induce 
innovation. The ability to block reuse eases the threat of competition from 
the secondary market.163 The ability to control effective product life helps 
sellers escape a curse on durable product monopolists that prevents them 
from charging a monopoly price. Ronald Coase conjectured, and 
microeconomists later confirmed, that durable product monopolists have 
trouble sustaining a price above the competitive price, because they have 
trouble committing themselves not to price discriminate over time.164 The 
prospect that price will fall over time, discourages high valuation 
consumers from making an early purchase at a high price, and thus the 
seller’s inability to commit to a high price leads to a relatively low initial 
price. One solution requires the seller to convert the durable product into a 
perishable product.165 Commitment to charge a high price is no longer a 
problem because high valuation users are repeatedly in the market along 
with all other users. The restraints discussed in this section have the effect 
of making products less durable, and they might be motivated by a desire to 
escape the Coase conjecture.166 
IP users would object that some restraints on repair and modification 
are socially harmful. These arguments are plausible in cases in which a 
second-hand market would increase output or when inefficient product life 
choices are made to overcome the Coase conjecture or support frequency of 
use pricing or some other form of price discrimination.167 To make these 
objections convincing IP users should also argue that profit and incentive to 
innovate would not be harmed too much by constraining repair and 
modification restraints. 
V.  PACKAGES 
IP owners sometimes insist that buyers and licensees take a package of 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
163 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 79-80 (1988) (the size of the 
profit to the monopolist depends on how the ease of recycling). 
164 See id. at 72-74, 80-87 (1988) (explaining the Coase conjecture). 
165 West Publishing has largely shifted from making law books, a durable good, to providing 
subscription databases. 
166 Cf. John Wiley, Eric Rasmusen, & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 693 (1990). This argument can be used to defend the position that mass-marketed software is 
licensed not sold. The debate about whether mass-marketed software should be characterized as 
licensed or sold see David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of 
Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17 (1999).  
167 See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 101-02. 
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products or licenses. Usually mandatory packages are profitable because 
they reduce enforcement or other transaction costs, or because they 
implement price discrimination. The convenience of packaging is easy to 
see when IP owners hold a large portfolio of patents or copyrights. A radio 
patent pool held 570 patents and 200 applications.168 ASCAP and BMI, the 
two larges music performance rights organizations each control millions of 
music copyrights.169 The role of packaging in price discrimination is a little 
more to difficult to see. 
 An example illustrates how packaging helps a seller achieve price 
discrimination.170 Suppose a company owns patents A and B that are of 
interest to two potential licensees X and Y. Suppose X would be willing to 
pay 2 for a license to A and 4 for a license to B. Suppose Y would be 
willing to pay 5 for a license to A and 3 for a license to B. The optimal 
price for the package is 6 which yields revenue of 12. If the patent owner 
sets separate fees for the licenses the price of A would be 5 and the price of 
B would be 3. Firm X would not take a license to A, and revenue would be 
5 from patent A plus 6 from patent B for a total of 11. Thus, the package 
gives more revenue to the patent owner and increases diffusion of the 
technology.171 
Unlike the other vertical restraints discussed in this Article, IP law 
regulates packaging pretty much the same way that antitrust does.172 The 
main tool of IP oversight is the misuse doctrine which follows antitrust 
doctrine regarding packaging quite closely. The convenience of packaging 
makes courts reluctant to find antitrust liability173 or apply the misuse 
doctrine.174 Courts have displayed some hostility toward packaging that 
                                                          ——————————————————— 
168 See Automatic Radio Manuf. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827 (1950). 
169 See BMI and ASCAP Reject Licensing Legislation, ascap.com, available at: 
http://www.ascap.com/press/1998/legislation-100898.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). 
170 See Stanley M. Besen & Sheila N. Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal 
Copyright Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255 (1989) (price discrimination by music performance rights 
societies); Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 109-11. 
171 It is also possible to construct examples such that packaging increases profit but reduces total 
output. Suppose firm Z is added to the market as a potential licensee and it values A at 5/3 and B at 2. 
The optimal price for a package is still 6 which yields the same revenue of 12. But if the patent owner is 
required to set separate royalty rates, then the optimal rate for A is 5/3 and the optimal rate for B is 2 
which yields total revenue of 11. Thus, total revenue (or profit) declines, but output grows because firm 
Z takes the licenses when they are priced separately, but not when they are offered as a package. 
172 See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 121, 124 (describing limited 
circumstances in which copyright facilitates packaging). 
173 See Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (approving BMI’s licensing 
practices as a convenient means of marketing and enforcing public performance licenses). 
174 See Automatic Radio Manuf. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827 (1950) (no misuse 
because the royalty scheme achieved simplicity in accounting and was done for the convenience of the 
parties). 
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implemented price discrimination,175 but that attitude is probably fading.176 
Only rare packaging cases where the plaintiff demonstrates a foreclosure or 
collusion facilitating effect are likely to violate antitrust laws or the misuse 
doctrine.177 
VI.  EXIT 
IP regulation of exit restraints is broader than antitrust regulation, but 
like packaging restraints, the IP approach to exit restraints approximates the 
antitrust approach.178 Exit restraints arise when contracting parties commit 
to a long-term relationship and commit not to deal with others. Such 
commitments can be an efficient way to encourage parties to invest in a 
relationship, but they occasionally pose a danger to competition.179 That 
danger is elevated when one of the parties owns patents or copyrights that 
might lead to market power.180 Patent law regulates certain restraints that 
impede a licensee’s ability to exit his relationship with a patent owner 
through the misuse and preemption doctrines.181 Copyright law has enacted 
compulsory licenses to moderate the danger that exclusive licenses can be 
used to create market power in downstream markets. 
Patent law condemns as misuse contract terms that extend the patent 
beyond its expiration date.182 This policy originates in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 
a case in which the patentee sold a hop picking machine to farmers under a 
contract which required royalty payments after the patents covering the 
machine had expired.183 Misuse also requires that when a patent owner 
licenses a package of IP rights containing U.S. patents the royalty rate must 
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175 See U. S. v. Loews Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 
U.S. 100 (1969); Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) Justice Stevens dissenting 
(harmful price discrimination implemented via the blanket license). 
176 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §22.6 (disapproving antitrust oversight of packaging 
designed to price discriminate). 
177 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §22; Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=185193 (packaging may cause exclusion when 
buyers have positively correlated valuations); Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling and 
Competition on the Internet, NYU Working Paper, available at: www.stern.nyu.edu/~bakos (April 
1999) (bundling may deter entry into markets for digital content). 
178 The goals pursued in Brulotte and Lear, discussed in the next two paragraphs, match antitrust 
goals, but derive from patent law rather than antitrust. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §23.2c. 
179 See, U.S. v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 874 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 
706 (1921) (canning company secured contracts for the entire output of canning machine manufacturers 
and also assignment or exclusive license of their patents). 
180 See id. 
181 See generally, Michael J. Meurer, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 
67 MINN. L. REV. 1198 (1983). 
182 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §3.3b3. 
183 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
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be reduced as patents in the package expire.184 
Patent law preempts contract terms that purport to require royalties on 
an invalid patent. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,185 Lear licensed a patented 
gyroscope from Adkins. Lear stopped making royalty payments because it 
believed the patent was invalid, and Adkins brought suit. The Supreme 
Court overturned a contract doctrine that estopped licensees from 
challenging the validity of a patent because patent law preempted the 
contract doctrine. Later cases extended preemption to various contract 
terms that discourage validity challenges.186 
In copyright protected markets important policy concerns arise with 
exit restraints that are directed upstream at creators. An interesting example 
comes from the player piano industry. In early twentieth century America 
piano rolls were a major source of revenue for the music industry.187 A firm 
named the Aeolian Company dominated the market for piano rolls and for 
player pianos.188 In the first decade of the century, Aeolian signed deals 
with several music publishers that granted Aeolian the exclusive right to 
make piano rolls using the songs in their catalogues.189 Interestingly, these 
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184 Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365 (1983), cert. den. 464 U.S. 893 (198x) (royalty 
payments must fall under package license containing trade secrets and patents when patents expire); 
Meehan v. PPG Industr., Inc., 802 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1986) (royalty payments on U.S. sales under 
package license containing Canadian, American, and British patents must end when American patent 
expires). Cf. Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. den. 477 U.S. 908 (198x) 
(misuse in assignment agreement that required payments for 25 years regardless of whether patents 
issued and imposed the same use restrictions after patent expiration). 
185 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
186 See Timely Products, Inc. v. Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 99 (D. Conn. 1979); Business Forms 
Finishing Service, Inc. v. Carson, 452 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir. 1971); Massillion—Cleveland—Akron Sign 
Co. v. Golden State Advertising, 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971). Just before the creation of the 
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court signaled a retreat from these cases in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil 
Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). A patent applicant negotiated a license calling for 5% royalties that would be 
reduced to 2(1/2)% if a patent did not issue within 5 years. See id. at 259-60. The Court enforced the 
contract despite the tension with Brulotte and Lear. See id. at 264-66. Brulotte and Lear are not popular 
with the Federal Circuit. See Universal Gym Equipment, Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equipment, Ltd., 827 
F.2d 1542, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. 
Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 
1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As a result, careful contract drafting usually avoids the threat of misuse or 
preemption. 
187 See Nimbus Records, available at: http://www.wyastone.co.uk/nrl/gp_tech.html (“Between 
1915 and 1930 the Reproducing Piano was very big business.”) 
188 Id. (“In its peak year, 1925, more than 192,000 domestic instruments were manufactured by 
the Aeolian Company in the USA, with a total sales value of $59,000,000.”) But see Robert P. Merges, 
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (questioning whether Aeolian Company dominated the player piano 
industry around the time of the 1909 copyright revisions). 
189 See Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note: Time To Say Good-Bye To Madonna's American Pie: Why 
Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put To Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 290 
(2001). Furthermore, the company “made every effort to perfect and enhance their invention, and 
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contracts were negotiated when the player piano was a relatively new 
technology, and there was uncertainty whether piano roll makers needed 
copyright permission. The Aeolian contracts were contingent on the courts 
or Congress establishing that piano rolls were subject to music composition 
copyrights. The Supreme Court decided piano rolls were not infringing 
copies because they were not fixed within the meaning of the 1870 
Copyright Act.190 Composers and music publishers lobbied Congress to 
make piano rolls subject to copyright law, and partially succeeded; 
Congress extended copyright law to cover mechanical reproductions of 
music.191 Player piano and piano roll competitors of Aeolian also lobbied 
Congress seeking relief from the market power Aeolian would get from its 
exclusive contracts. Congress responded by combining the mechanical 
reproduction right with a compulsory license provision that effectively 
nullified the exclusionary term in the Aeolian contracts.192 
IP regulation of exit restraints presents the same basic policy concerns 
presented by antitrust regulation.193 Certain exit restraints are used to deter 
entry or raise the costs of competing with the firm that imposes the 
restraints, but most exit restraints advance some efficiency goal.194 The 
difficult question is how to deter harmful restraints without discouraging 
efficient restraints. For example, restraints like those in Brulotte might have 
an anti-competitive effect similar to certain long-term requirements 
contracts,195 or they might simply implement a convenient payment method 
———————————————————————————————— 
throughout this period they kept the most famous pianists under contract.” See Nimbus Records, 
available at: http://www.wyastone.co.uk/nrl/gp_tech.html. 
190 See White-Smith Music Publishing v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
191 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 ORE. L. REV. 
275 (1989). The relevant provision of the current copyright statute is 17 U.S.C. §115 which gives a 
compulsory license to a music composition copyright to anyone who independently records a 
composition after the first authorized copy is released. 
192 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 65-67 (1994); Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing Of Blacked-Out 
Professional Team Sporting Event Telecasts (Ptsets): Using Copyright Law To Mitigate Monopolistic 
Behavior, 32 HARV. J. LEGIS. 403, 417-428 (1995) (discussing Aeolian and more recent examples of 
copyright compulsory licenses as tools for mitigating harm caused by the exercise of market power). 
193 Antitrust regulates forced exclusive dealing on principles similar to those followed in Brulotte 
and its progeny. For a discussion of antitrust regulation of exclusive dealing in IP protected markets see 
generally, HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §21.7b, §21.7c (discussing foreclosure and other social 
harms, and competitive rationales). Antitrust regulation of the patent settlement issues implicated by 
Lear is discussed in this issue by Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive 
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. (2003); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the 
“Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A 
Comment on Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. _ (2003); Maureen A. O’Rourke & 
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlement Agreements:  A Comment on the Work of 
Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. _ (2003). 
194 See SULLIVAN AND GRIMES, supra note 24, at §7.3b 
195 See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964). 
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for liquidity constrained users.196 Similarly, restrictions on challenges to the 
validity of a patent might preserve an entry barrier based on an invalid 
patent, but they also promote efficient settlement of litigation.197 The 
compulsory licensing approach used in copyright is quite difficult to 
manage effectively because of the twin problems of deciding when a 
compulsory license is appropriate, and fixing an appropriate royalty rate.198 
CONCLUSION 
IP law is much more active than antitrust law in regulating vertical 
restraints in IP protected markets.199 Vertical restraints are implemented 
through contract, IP enforcement, and product design. Antitrust regulates 
vertical restraints by condemning contract terms that are judged anti-
competitive. IP law often takes a similar approach, condemning certain 
contract terms through application of the misuse and preemption doctrines. 
But IP law has additional means of influencing contract based restrictions. 
It encourages vertical restrictions by bolstering contract remedies with IP 
remedies when a user violates a use restriction, and it provides default 
terms to fill incomplete contracts. Furthermore, IP facilitates vertical 
restraints by granting IP rights against strangers who might interfere with 
the restraints by playing the role of arbitrageur or materially assisting an act 
of infringement. IP law inevitably must be more active than antitrust in 
regulating vertical restraints — the law must specify rules about what kinds 
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196 See WARD BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL x 
(1973); Michael J. Meurer, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67 MINN. L. 
REV. 1198, 1217-1222 (1983) (leveraging argument in Brulotte not persuasive). 
197 See id. at 1209; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the 
Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 718-24 (1986). 
198 See Robert P. Merges, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1308-16 (1996) (criticizing the mechanical 
license because the license fee is set without regard to market forces). 
199 An important topic for future research is the question of how IP regulates horizontal restraints 
compared to antitrust law. My impression is that the differences are not as striking as they are in the 
case of vertical restraints. Some examples of intellectual property law doctrines that regulate horizontal 
competition include: the copyright fair use doctrine which encourages reverse engineering, see e.g., 
Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); the idea-expression dichotomy, see e.g., Baker v. 
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); the merger doctrine and related copyright doctrines that preclude copyright 
protection of functional aspects of computer progams, see e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc., 982 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1992); Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 
1995), aff’d by equally divided Court, 116 S.Ct. 804 (1996); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 24 at 
818-22 (noting the role of copyright law in regulating competition in the computer industry); the patent 
statutory bar provision of Section 102(b) which protects firms from hold-up based on a patent suit when 
the invention appears to be in the public domain, see e.g., General Elec. Co. v. U.S., 645 F.2d 55, 61 
(Ct.Cl. 1981); the first inventor defense against business method patent infringement; see 35 U.S.C. 
§273; the trademark doctrines allowing fair use, see e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 
Inc. 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983) and invalidating generic marks, see e.g., The Murphy Bed Co., v. 
Interior Sleep System, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); and the functionality defense against trade dress 
infringement, see e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
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of uses are infringing. 
Product design choices implement vertical restraints through 
technological ties. Antitrust only weakly regulates product design 
decisions. Courts are reluctant to recognize tying claims based on product 
design choices because they fear they will discourage socially valuable 
innovation. In contrast, IP law actively regulates technological ties, it 
encourages ties by protecting product interfaces through patent, trade 
secret, and anti-circumvention law, and it discourages ties by promoting 
reverse engineering intended to discover product compatibility 
requirements. Furthermore, patent and copyright promote price 
discrimination by restricting product modifications that aid arbitrage 
against price discrimination. 
Reviewing six types of vertical restraints, it appears that IP law offers 
more extensive regulation of every type except perhaps packaging and exit. 
Regulation of packaging through patent misuse basically mimics antitrust 
regulation of packaging.200 Patent law oversight of exit restraints comprises 
the rules from Brulotte against post-expiration royalties and from Lear 
against terms that prevent patent challenges. Neither patent nor antitrust 
courts are likely to expand these rules; courts are disposed to believe exit 
restraints enhance efficiency and are unlikely to condemn other exit 
restraints absent a strong showing of harm to competition.201 
IP law regulates the other four types of restraints more extensively 
than antitrust because: the rent-seeking costs of opportunistic and anti-
competitive litigation are smaller; it uses regulatory instruments other than 
simple prohibitions; and it shows greater concern about the welfare effect 
of end use restrictions. IP doctrines that discourage vertical restraints 
generally cause smaller rent-seeking problems than antitrust doctrines with 
a similar effect. IP rules that provide background entitlements are relatively 
clear compared to antitrust rules which require uncertain rule of reason 
analysis. Furthermore, IP prohibitions that are implemented through 
preemption or misuse do not give rise to treble damages, and can only be 
used defensively. In contrast, broad antitrust regulation of vertical restraints 
creates a threat of opportunistic suits because of uncertainty, the lure of 
treble damages, and the possibility of initiating a suit against a vulnerable 
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200 Copyright law facilitates packaging to a small degree by impeding unbundling of a package. 
See  Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 125. 
201 Recent antitrust “cases suggest a skepticism toward claims of forced exclusive dealing, 
restricting recovery to cases in which the defendant has foreclosed a substantial percentage of the 
market.” See HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, at §7.3d. The Federal Circuit appears hostile to Brulotte and 
Lear and reads them narrowly. See Dreyfuss, supra note 199, at  693-707. 
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defendant.202 The greater reach and wider policy concerns of IP law are 
reflected in doctrines that affect price discrimination, product durability, 
and sharing. Many IP doctrines promote or discourage price discrimination 
by tolerating or discouraging arbitrage. Certain IP doctrines regulate repair 
and modification and affect the profit that can be earned by IP owners who 
are durable product monopolists. Finally, various copyright doctrines 
encourage or discourage users from forming coalitions that can bargain 
more effectively with copyright owners. 
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202 But see Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of Patent Misuse 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 
1615-18 (1990) (misuse overdeters); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of 
Intellectual Property Licensing 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 145 (2001) (pre-emption lacks nuance); 
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